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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
. . „ . . • : • '- :TRNERS, INf 
a L> LotXX W l W U l U • 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
ASSOCIATED BOLi & SLi'i'i-'* < • 
INC., an Idaho corporation, aka J \ 
R PRODUCTS, A. WAYNE ROBT 
SON and FARRELL J. JONES, 
Defendants • ""/ Apm>llunt> 
BRIE I- 'H- XPPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
PUdntiff-Re8poiiden.t, \>- Metals \ , steners, Inc. 
sued Associated Bolt & Supply <~o. Inc. tor goods sold 
on account, fiir'ther alleging that Defendants-Appellants, 
Farrell J. Jones and A Wsvm* Robinson, were person-
ally liable for the account on tin* basK ot a guarantee. 
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DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court held that the Defendants-Appellants, 
A. Wayne Robinson and Farrell J. Jones had orally guar-
antee the account of Associated Bolt & Supply, that Plain-
tiff-Respondent had relied on the alleged guarantee to 
its detriment, and that;, therefore, Jones and Robinson 
were estopped to assert the Statute of Frauds. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Appellants, Farrell J. Jones and A. 
Wayne Robinson, seek reversal of the trial court's find-
ings that they are liable on the basis of an oral guarantee 
to Plaintiff -Respondent for the account of Associated 
Bolt. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Associated Bolt & Supply Co., Inc. was a firm selling 
bolts, nuts, and other hardware to farmers and small 
businesses with its principal place of business located in 
Pocatello, Idaho. Assoeiated's original supplier was an 
entity called F & R Enterprises, which Associated Bolt 
believed to be a subsidiary of All Metals and Fasteners, 
Inc., the Plaintiff-Respondent in this action. In 1972, All 
Metals and Fasteners, Inc. filed a lawsuit against its 
own corporate president alleging that he had been using 
F & R Enterprises as a means to sell the inventory of 
All Metals & Fasteners, Inc. to Associated at a profit 
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for himself. (R. 135) In addition to filing suit against 
F & R Enterprises and its own corporate president, All 
Metals sued Associated Bolt & Supply and A. Wayne 
Robinson, president of Associated. Associated Bolt & 
Supply Company had been the primarv customer of 
F & R Enterprises, and in the suit All Metals alleged thai 
Associated and Robinson had been involved .1: ,-r n»n 
spiracy with F & R Enterprises. At the time suit was 
brought, Associated^ supply of pixxii icts wa? <*>* '»ff uy 
All Metals (R 1 35-1 38) 
Early 111 1 973, and not long after -<iui &uit h. ^ « i 
filed, certain officers of All Metals & Fasteners and its 
attorney journeyed to Pocatello, Idaho to meet with the 
president of Associated Bolt & Supply, the Defendant-
Appellant, A. Wayne Robinson, and a man they believed 
to be "the attorney for Associated Bolt & Supply, the De-
fendant-Appellant Mr. Farrall J. Jones. On "this occasion 
it was learned that Mr. Jones was not an attorney but 
rather a certified public accountant who bad from time 
to tune advised Mr. Robinson in his "business affairs and 
had bean the accountant for Associated Bolt & Supply. 
Upon learning that Mr. Jones was not an attorney, the 
parties resolved to meet again, this time with Associated 
Rah & Supph having counsel ureses r" U<s~139) 
-*•.• -Kjuentlv, in January of 1972, a subsequent meet-
ing vvas held. I' ^-. \ii Metals aiul Fasteners' desire 
at this meeting u* l*%i.n whether Associated Boh i^ 
ply Company vvas in an> way involved m a eonspirae\ 
"
?
 k R Knterpnses, and, il not <! >ia- V* Metals' 
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desire to obtain the cooperation of Associated Bolt & 
Supply to prove its case against its corporate president 
and F & R Enterprises. (R. 139-140) It was the desire 
of Associated Bolt & Supply Company to assure All Met-
als and Fasteners that it had not known of any wrong 
doing by F & R Enterprises and to cooperate fully with All 
Metals so that All Metals & Fasteners would dismiss its 
suit and continue to supply it. (R. 139-141) 
At this meeting, therefore, Associated Bolt & Supply 
made available its invoices and asked its accountant, 
Farrell J. Jones, to make available the books of account. 
Copies of these records were made available to All Metals 
& Fasteners so that they coud be reviewed in detail to 
determine what Associated's relationship with F & R En-
terprises had been. All Metals & Fasteners at this time 
would not agree to continue to sell to Associated Bolt 
& Supply until it had an opportunity to review the rec-
ords, and further it was stated by one of All Metals' offi-
cers that if All Metals were to sell to Associated, Mr. 
Robinson would have to personally guarantee the ac-
count. (R. 140-141) It was disputed at trial whether it 
was stated that Mr. Jones would be required to furnish 
a guarantee as well. All Metals' attorney stated that the 
guarantee should be in writing and that he would prepare 
one. (R. 141) 
Subsequently, a written guarantee was sent to As-
sociated by All Metals which purported to be a guaran-
tee by both A. Wayne Robinson, president of Associated 
Bolt & Supply, and Farrell J. Jones, the accountant. Upon 
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receiving the guarantee, Mr. Jones told Mr. Robinson 
that he would not guarantee the debts of Associated Bolt 
& Supply and the guarantee was put aside. According to 
the testimony of defendant Jones, Mr. Jones thereafter 
agreed to sign the guarantee, but first Mr. Watts, an 
officer of Plaintiff-Respondent corporation, was called 
and told that Mr. Jones would not guarantee the debts 
of Associated Bolt & Supply, but would guarantee the 
account of a new entity, J & R Products Company, a pro-
posed "Joint-venture" between Jones and Robinson. The 
term "J & R Products" was then inserted in the stead of 
Associated Bolt & Supply on the written guarantee and 
the guarantee was signed by Robinson and Jones and 
returned to All Metals & Fasteners. On the other hand, 
Mr. Watts testified that he was called and that a change 
from Associated Bolt to J & R Products was discussed 
and approved by him but asserts that this was still a 
guarantee of Associated's account. (R. 145) 
All Metals & Fasteners did not request any other 
written guarantee from either Mr. Jones or Mr. Robin-
son, or protest the change, (R. 147) Not long there-
after, All Metals refused to sell to Associated or J & R 
Products; only one or two sales had been invoiced to 
J & R Products. (R. 191) 
All Metals & Fasteners brought this action against 
Associated Bolt, and Farrell J. Jones and A. Wayne Rob-
inson personally, seeking to recover on the Associated 
Bolt account, alleging that the guarantee signed by Mr. 
Robinson and Mr. Jones guaranteeing the debts of J & R 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Products was a guarantee for product sold to Associated 
Bolt & Supply, and further alleging that Associated Bolt 
did business as J & R Products. The trial court ruled 
that the written guarantee was not a guarantee on the 
part of Jones and Robinson of the debts of Associated. 
On the day of trial, however, the trial court permitted 
All Metals & Fasteners to amend its complaint to in-
dude the allegation that Jones and Robinson had made 
oral guarantees guaranteeing the debts of Associated Bolt 
prior to the signing of the written guarantee of J & R 
Products. 
At trial, Assodated Bolt did not dispute the amount 
claimed and does not; dispute the judgment entered 
against it by this appeal. Defendants-Appellants Farrell 
J. Jones and A. Wayne Robinson appeal on the grounds 
that the court erred in holding them liable for the debts 
of Associated Bolt on the basis of an oral guarantee. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT JONES AND ROBINSON 
WERE PREJUDICED BY THE DECISION 
OF THE TRIAL COURT TO PERMIT 
PLAINTIFF TO AMEND ITS COMLAINT 
ON THE DAY OF TRIAL. 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that a party may amend his pleading by leave 
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of court and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires. Defendants and Appellants Jones and Robin-
son claim, however, that in the instant case justice was 
not served by the amendment. 
Plaintiff's original complaint was filed December 29, 
1972, and a first amended complaint was filed on October 
11, 1973. The case came on for trial September 13, 1974, 
at which time the trial court allowed plaintiff to amend 
to allege an oral guarantee. Plaintiff made no allegation 
that the failure to include the latter amendment previ-
ously was due to excusable failure or neglect. (R. 25) 
In fact, no excuse or explanation for the tardiness of the 
of the amendment was given. 
The only evidence introduced at trial to support 
the allegation of the new cause of action set forth in 
plaintiff's second amended complaint was the testimony 
of Richard Watts, Earl Osborn, and Leslie Curtis, re-
spectively major stockholders and directors and an em-
ployee of plaintiff corporation. This testimony was at 
all times available to plaintiff. Nevertheless, Jones and 
Robinson concede that the trial court had the discretion 
to grant the amendment unless they were prejudiced by 
the amendment but allege that they were prejudiced in 
two ways. 
First, it is evident that Mr. Robinson, who as presi-
dent of Associated, was most acquainted with Associat-
ed's dealings with All Metals. In addition to being a party, 
he would have been an important witness and defendants 
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were entitled to a reasonable opportunity to have him 
present if the case were to be tried on the oral guarantee 
issue. 
T H E C O U R T : * * * 
The plaintiff has filed a second amended com-
plaint and desires to have the suit tried on that 
basis, which is objected to by the defendants. 
(R. 134) 
T H E COURT: The record may show that 
you can't get the deposition of Mr. Robinson 
because of his physical condition. 
MR. P E C K : Can't get it at this time, Your 
Honor but the record may show we have asked 
for an extension. 
T H E COURT: You don't know that you 
will ever get it, do you? 
MR. P E C K : No, Your Honor, we don't. 
T H E COURT: So that if the court tried to 
get you evidence, it would be an indefinite con-
tinuance until he might get better? 
MR. P E C K : Your Honor, all we could ask 
for would be, I think, a reasonable period of 
time. 
T H E COURT: This man Robinson, as you 
stated, is in critical condition in that his heart 
is such that if his deposition is taken, it may 
cause his death? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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MR. P E C K : I would not want to be respon-
sible for that. 
T H E COURT: Isn't that your statement? 
MR. P E C K : That is my statement, Your 
Honor. And I haven't talked personally with 
his doctor. I am relying on what he has told me, 
and his doctor's [written] statement. 
T H E COURT: Have you heard it in any 
other way in presenting your evidence on this 
second amended complaint? 
MR. P E C K : The only other thing we would 
be able to do, Your Honor, would be able to 
look through it and talk with Mr. Robinson's 
wife and see if there might be memoranda of 
conversations. I have no reason to believe that 
there are any, I don't know. 
T H E COURT: You have a week though to 
find out. 
MR. P E C K : Yes, Your Honor, but she's 
been at the hospital in Spokane with her hus-
band, and they live in Pocatello. 
T H E COURT: Thank you. 
(R. at 209-210) 
Second, it is evident from the file that defendants 
took no deposition and engaged in little discovery. Said 
defendants' pretrial preparation centered around the writ-
ten document plaintiff had claimed represented a personal 
guarantee. The tactic of saving expenses and fees by not 
taking the deposition of All Metals' witnesses is borne out 
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by the trial court's ruling that the written guarantee did 
not obligate defendants Jones and Robinson for the debts 
of Associated. Defendants Jones and Robinson were en-
titled to rely upon the first amended complaint as alleg-
ing the facts to be tried. Defendants were not required 
to engage in discovery in anticipation of last minute 
amendments. 
The late date of the amendment to include the issue 
of an oral guarantee prejudiced Jones' and Robinson's op-
portunity for discovery on the issues upon which the case 
was actually tried. Furthermore, to lessen the prejudice 
to defendants a postponement for a reasonable time 
should have been granted allowing time for Mr. Robin-
son's physical condition to improve thereby giving de-
fendants an opportunity to have their most important 
witness appear on the issue of an oral guarantee. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT AN ORAL GUARANTEE HAD BEEN 
MADE BY JONES GUARANTEEING THE 
DEBTS OF ASSOCIATED BOLT AND SUP-
PLY. 
On the day of trial, the lower court permitted plaiii-
tiff to amend its complaint to include the allegation of 
oral guarantees allegedly made by Jones and Robinson. 
Plaintiff presented testimony at trial through Rich-
ard Watts, a major sitockholder and a director of plaintiff 
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corporation, Earl Osborne, president of plaintiff corpora-
tion, and Leslie Curtis, an employee, that Jones had 
made an oral guarantee at a meeting early in 1972 at 
Pocatello, Idaho. (R. 167) This allegation was put into 
dispute by the testimony of Mr. Jones who testified that 
he had made no such guarantee. The weight of the evi-
dence, however, resolves the disput in favor of the fact 
that there was no oral guarantee and that there was no 
substantial evidence to support a finding of an oral guar-
antee, contrary to the ruling of the lower court. 
It was undisputed at trial that one of the reasons the 
attorney and personnel from All Metals had come to 
Idaho was to ascertain to what extent, if any, Associated 
Bolt & Supply was involved in a conspiracy with F & R 
Enterprises. Certain of the books and records and books 
of account of Associated Bolt & Supply were made avail-
able for All Metals' analysis so that All Metals could be 
satisfied that Associated Bolt was not involved. All 
Metals' position that oral guarantees were made is in-
consistent with its then pending suit against Associated, 
and its desire to determine to what extent Associated was 
involved with F & R Enterprises. Thus, at the meeting at 
which All Metals & Fasteners alleges that an oral guar-
antee was made by A. Wayne Robinson and Farrell J. 
Jones, it is quite apparent that due to the pending liti-
gation that there was not even an agreement at that time 
on the part of All Metals & Fasteners to continue to sup-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ply Associated Bolt & Supply Company. On this issue, 
Mrs. Curtis testified for plaintiff on direct examination 
concerning the meeting in Pocatello as follows: 
Well, as I recall, Mr. Jones brought up the 
subject that Associated Bolt still needed a sup-
plier because they were cooperating with All 
Metals and hopefully would be released from 
the suit [against Associated Bolt and F & R 
Enterprises] and would All Metals consider 
selling Associated Bolts, direct selling, which 
we hadn't done for some time. And at that 
time Mr. Watts said that yes, it possibly 
would consider selling, but he would have to 
have a personal guarantee before he would be 
able to sell. (R. 167) (emphasis added) 
A written guarantee of Associated's account was pre-
pared and mailed by All Metals calling for both Mr. Rob-
inson's and Mr. Jones' signatures. At first, Mr. Jones re-
fused to sign, and subsequently signed only when the 
gauarantee had been altered to guarantee the account of 
the new entity J & R Rxxlucts Company. The reason for 
this is obvious. Mr. Jones stated at trial that Mr. Robin-
son was not a very good administrator or manager and a 
poor businessman. The only way that Mr. Jones have 
protected himself with Mr. Robinson running the com-
pany would be to have sales made to an entity over which 
he had some control, i.e., the joint venture, J & R Pro-
ducts Company. Even Watts admitted that Jones had 
told him that he did not want to associate himself with 
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any part of the Associated name and insisted that the 
name on the guarantee be changed. (R. 145) 
After signing the written guarantee wherein J & R 
Products and All Metals, Mr. Jones asked Mr. Robinson 
several times if All Metals and Fasteners had begun to 
ship to J & R Products Company. 
" I said, Wayne, we have got to—first I asked 
him, 'Is All Metals now selling and invoicing 
J R?' and he says, 'No, they are not.' and I 
says, 'Well why aren't they?' and he says, 'The 
next time I go down there I will ask them why 
they are not.' and I says, 'Well, its' very im-
portant, Wayne, because we have got to cut 
this off and take inventory and so forth so we 
can have a clean break between Associated 
a n d J & R . ' " 
Jones had no control over or interest in Associated Bolt 
and could not regulate any of its business dealings with 
All Metals & Fasteners or any other entity, and since 
he had made no guarantee to All Metals he had no duty 
to inform them that he was not guaranteeing the debts 
of Associated. 
The undisputed facts are that All Metals & Fasten-
ers continued to invoice and sell to Associated Bolt & 
Supply Company, both before and after the written guar-
antee was signed. Mr. Jones imdisputedly refused to sign 
the original guarantee and signed only when "J & R 
Products" was inserted in the stead of "Associated Bolt 
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& Supply Company." The change of the guarantee is 
totally inconsistent with any alleged oral guarantee which 
All Metals contends had been made previously by Jones 
guaranteeing the debts; and obligations of Associated Bolt 
& Supply Company. This fact is further substantiated 
by All Metal's acceptance without objection of the writ-
ten guarantee with the substitution of J & R Products 
for Associated Bolt. (R. 147) 
The weight of the undisputed evidence clearly out-
weighs the self-serving testimony of All Metals' own per-
sonnel which at best was nebulous and very vague as to 
who gave an oral guarantee and how it was given. (See 
R. 141, 167) 
The trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff had met 
its burden of proof rascessary to establish that an oral 
guarantee had been made by Defendant-Appellant Jones. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM ALLEGING AN ORAL 
GUARANTEE IS BARRED BY THE STAT-
UTE OF FRAUDS. 
On the day of the trial the lower court permitted 
plaintiff to amend its complaint to include the allegation 
that the defendants Jones and Robinson had orally 
agreed to guarantee the Associated Bolt account. At the 
conclusion of trial the court found that there had been 
an oral guarantee by both Jones and Robinson and that 
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said deefndants were estopped to assert the Statute of 
Frauds. The court further concluded that the alleged 
oral representations made by said defendants were the 
basis of plaintiff's reliance to its detriment: 
Defendants have conducted themselves by oral-
ly agreeing to guarantee the debts sued upon 
herein so as to estop them from deyning the 
effect and result of their acts, thus causing 
plaintiff to sell its merchandise to Associated 
Bolt and Supply, Inc., resulting in the dam-
ages to plaintiff enumerated herein." (R. 15) 
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, it has been stated: 
I t is clear, however, that an estoppel to assert 
the statute of frauds does not arise merely be-
cause an oral contract within the statute has 
been acted upon by the promisee and not per-
formed by the promisor. Neither does an 
estoppel arise upon the mere refusal to make a 
writing as agreed. 73 Am.Jur. Statute of 
Frauds, § 567. 
The policy behind the rule that an estoppel to assert 
the Statute of Frauds does not arise in the case of an 
oral guarantee merely because the oral contract has been 
acted upon has been stated as follows: 
There is a temptation for a promisee, in a case 
where the real debtor has proved insolvent or 
unable to pay, to enlarge the scope of the 
promise, or to tortue mere words of encourage-
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ment and confidence into an absolute promise. 
Moreover, because it is so obviously just that 
a promisor receiving none of the benefits for 
which the debt was incurred should be bound 
only by the exact term of his promise, this pro-
vision of the statute requiring a memorandum 
in writing to evidence or render enforceable 
a promise to answer for the debt of another 
was enacted. 72 Am. Jur.2d Statute of Frauds, 
§ 179. 
This reasoning is applicable to the instant case. There 
is no evidence nor allegation that Jones received any of 
the benefits for which the debt was incurred, while plain-
tiff has had every motivation to enlarge the scope of oral 
conversations. 
Precedent of the Utah Supreme Court further estab-
lishes the fact that it was error for the trial court to re-
move the alleged oral guarantee from the Statute of 
Frauds. In the instant case, the trial court ruled that 
defendant Jones made an oral promise that he would 
guarantee the account of Associated Bolt and that plain-
tiff relied upon this promise to its detriment. But in 
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335 (1957), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that a breach of a promise as 
to future conduct or because of a disappointment of ex-
pectations of an executoiy agreement would not give rise 
to an estoppel. 
In Easton v. Wycoff, 4 U.2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956) 
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the Utah Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel, extended, to a limited extent, to 
cases involving the Statute of Frauds where the promise 
as to future conduct constituted the intended abandon-
ment of an existing right of the promissor. 
The rule that an oral promise within the Statute of 
Frauds will not give rise to an estoppel unless the' prom-
ise constitutes the abandonment of an existing right such 
as waiving the right to have a guarantee in writing, has 
been recently approved by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Malcolm v. The Corporation of the President, .....,P.2d...... 
(Utah Sup. Ct. No. 13553, filed December 17, 1974.) 
Even if the alleged estoppel is based upon and char-
acterized as part performance, the rule is nevertheless 
clear that an oral promise such as has been alleged in the 
instant case is not removed from the Statute of Frauds. 
Part performance does not take an oral promise 
to answer for the debt or default of another 
out of the Statute of Frauds, since neither past 
nor even full performance by the promisee of 
the consideration for the promise enriches the 
promisor. I t has been held that a mere collat-
eral promise to answer for the debt, default, or 
miscarriage of another, invalid because not re-
duced to writing is not susceptible of part per-
formance as between the principal contracting 
parties. So as to afford the collateral promisee 
a right of action in equity to compel the mak-
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ing of a valid guarantee in writing. 73 Am. Jur . 
Statute of Frauds § 468. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant-Appellant Jones had no interest in As-
sociated Bolt, and it was not shown that he was to benefit 
in any way by guaranteeing the Associated Bolt's ac-
count with plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim that it relied to its 
detriment upon an alleged oral promise made by Jones 
is barred by the Statute of Frauds. An estoppel does not 
arise in the instant aise because a promise to pay the 
account of Associated Bolt, if Associated were unable to 
do so, does not fall within the requirement that the 
promise be the abandonment of an existing right. 
Morevover, there was no substantial evidence that 
defendant orally agreed to guarante the account of As-
sociated, and a reading of plaintiff's witnesses' testimony 
substantiates this. (R. 141, 167) The economic realities 
of the situation, the wri tten agreement and the testimony 
of Mr. Jones all outweigh the vague agreement as de-
scribed by witnesses Watts and Curtis. 
Finally, the amendment on the day of trial preju-
diced both Jones and Robinson. Plaintiff's witnesses had 
not be deposed, and indeed if they had been, there was 
no notice that the issue of an oral guarantee should be 
investigated. The amendment to include the claim of oral 
promise substantially siffected the issues presented at 
trial as can be seen from comparing the allegations of the 
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First Amended Complaint with the testimony of the wit-
nesses. Since conversations were a critical part of plain-
tiff's case on the oral agreement issue, Defendants-Ap-
pellants were entitled to a reasonable opportunity to have 
Mr. Robinson's testimony presented. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Earl Jay Peck 
NIELSEN, CONDER, 
HENRIOD AND 
GOTTFREDSON 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Defendants and Appellants 
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